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Introduction
“GMM approaches based on Euler equations were designed to deliver only
part of an economic model. Their virtue and liability is that they are based
on partial specifications of an econometric model [...] This is both a strength
and a weakness [...] [They] allow an econometrician to learn about something
without having the need to learn about everything [...] [H]owever, [they] limit
the questions that can be answered by an empirical investigation. For instance,
the analysis of hypothetical interventions or policy changes typically requires
a fully specified dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model.”
Lars Peter Hansen (2002)
The aim of this paper is to point out some perils1 of policy rule regression, especially
when the regression is conducted from a single equation. As L.P. Hansen states, in order
to fully recognize the effects of any economic policy, a complete dynamic exercise within
a general equilibrium model must be performed. Disregarding a complete modelling may
lead to spurious conclusions about the effects of economic policy.
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest about the identification of policy
rules that the economic authorities are assumed to follow. Notably, applied monetary
economics estimates single equations using instrumental variables in order to describe the
reaction function of the central bank, which is assumed to respond to changes in expected
inflation and the output gap away their targets. For example, Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler
(2000) estimate a monetary policy rule using GMM and document how the change in
their estimation accounts for economic (monetary) stability.
The work of Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler has been criticized by recent contributions as it
does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that their single equation would be probably
part of a system (see Linde (2002), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)). Moreover, a single
equation approach suffers from a lack of identification (especially when weak instruments
are used), contrary to full–information environments (see Mavroeidis (2004a), (2004b),
Nason and Smith (2003)). Another problematic issue is presented in Beyer and Farmer
(2003, 2004), where it is shown that a single equation approach tell us nothing about
the real nature of aggregate fluctuations, i.e., a given policy may be either associated to
1The reader could easily find some analogy with the paper of Benhabib, Schmitt–Grohe and Uribe
(2001b).
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fundamental shocks or to sunspot shocks.
In this paper, we present two perils of policy rule regression. The first one is that nothing
ensures that the estimated parameters could represent a unique type of structural behavior
of the agents. These estimates may correspond only to aggregate co–movements that
characterize the equilibrium of the economy. In this case, the estimated policy rule is just
a reduced form of a model where the empirical parameters are not policy invariant, thus
illustrating the famous Lucas critique. However, this first peril is not so problematic if the
estimated policy rule is not taken too seriously, i.e., if the estimation is considered only
as a useful description of the data. The second – and more important – peril comes when
the estimated rule is taken seriously and becomes a policy recommendation. In this case,
the estimated rule when placed in the original model creates indeterminacy and sunspot
fluctuations.
In order to illustrate these two types of perils, we consider a simple linear rational expec-
tations model with an exogenous policy rule. The stationary solution will be given by a
linear relation between the endogenous variable and the exogenous one, that can be stated
or represented in terms of any of them. Suppose now that an econometrician wants to
estimate a policy rule using actual data (generated by the model with exogenous policy)
on these two variables. She could believe that the estimated policy rule is endogenous,
not paying attention to the true (exogenous) character of the policy function. If this
estimation is interpreted as the structural behavior of policy–makers, this will constitute
the first peril. Moreover, when the econometrician uses the estimated policy function in
order to study the implied aggregate dynamics of the model economy, our results show
immediately that the equilibrium is indeterminate and that aggregate fluctuations can be
driven by sunspots. This is the second (and more serious) peril of policy rule regression.
We then extent this simple model in order to account for measurement errors or multiple
exogenous variables. It turns out that if the measurement errors (or the additional exoge-
nous variables) explain a large part of the variations of the endogenous variable, we have
no longer indeterminacy, since the policy variable does not play any role at equilibrium.
Finally, we consider an illustration of these two perils within the Taylor rule regression
that is performed in applied monetary economics. Specifically, we consider an exogenous
money growth rule together with technological and government spending shocks in a stan-
dard cash–in–advance (CIA) economy. A calibration exercise shows that the estimated
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parameters of the Taylor type rule are similar to those founded in the empirical literature
for the U.S. economy. A quantitative exercice shows that the policy rule regression prin-
ciple is not sufficiently informative about the structural behavior of the Federal Reserve.
Moreover, the estimated Taylor type rule leads to real indeterminacy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a simple rational expectations
model with an exogenous policy rule and the principle of policy rule regression with a
forward-looking policy. Conditions for indeterminacy under the estimated policy function
are presented. Section 2 covers the extensions to account for measurement errors and
multiple exogenous variables. Section 3 contains the Taylor rule’s application. Finally,
the last section presents some concluding remarks.
1 The model and Policy Rule Regression
We first briefly present a simple rational expectations model. We then discuss the principle
of policy rule regression and the implied aggregate dynamics with the estimated policy
rule.
1.1 The model
We consider a representation of an economy that expresses a single endogenous variable
yt in period t as a linear function of the conditional (on the available information at time
t) expectation of this same variable in period t + 1 and a single exogenous variable xt.
The model is deliberately stylized in order to deliver clear results about the policy rule
regression. This economy takes the form:
yt = aEtyt+1 + bxt (1)
where b 6= 0 and |a| < 1. When xt is purely exogenous, this last assumption implies
that the rational expectations model is determinate. A stationary solution would be thus
obtained iterating (1) forward.2 Et is the conditional expectation operator with respect to
the current and past values of {xt, xt−1, ...}. Note that we use here the minimal information
set sequence, but it has no consequences as the inclusion of the current and past values of
{yt, yt−1, ...} in the information set is redundant and extraneous processes like sunspots
do not matter in the determinate case. The parameters a and b are given scalars that
are supposed to be known. In what follows, we are not concerned with the identification
2Following Gourieroux, Laffont and Monfort (1982), among others, this simple model has been widely
used in order to study the solutions of linear rational expectations models (see e.g. Blanchard and Fisher
(1989), Broze and Szafarz (1991) and Farmer (1999)).
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and estimation of these two parameters, but only with the quantitative implications of
the solution for policy rule regression. We consider that xt follows an exogenous rule of
the form:
xt = ρxt−1 + σεt with εt ∼ iid(0, 1) (2)
where |ρ| < 1 and σ > 0. The assumption that xt is AR(1) is widely used in macroe-
conomic dynamics. It allows to simply represent the time series behavior of the forcing
variable. Moreover, one must remark that xt can be correlated with yt. In this case, we
have just to modify (1), taking into account the feedback effect of xt on yt. The AR(1)
specification then represents the pure exogenous component in xt.
Without loss of generality, we omit a constant term both in (1) and (2) since the endoge-
nous and exogenous variables can be considered as deviations from their average value.
Equation (1) defines either a linear or a log–linear representation of the equilibrium con-
ditions in a dynamic model. Moreover, equation (1) can represent either a linear or a
log–linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions of a non–linear model. Despite its
simplicity, this simple linear representation embodies several model economies: the Cagan
model, the monetary model of exchange rate determination, asset pricing models, dynamic
factor demand models, business cycle models, monetary models with a cash–in–advance
constraint3, and so on.
Using forward substitutions, the endogenous variable is expressed by
yt = bEt
T∑
i=0
aixt+i + a
T+1Etyt+T+1
Excluding explosive paths, i.e.,
lim
T→∞
aT+1Etyt+T+1 = 0
the forward solution takes the form:
yt = bEt
∞∑
i=0
aixt+i
Using the exogenous policy rule (2), the solution is
yt = b
(
∞∑
i=0
aiρi
)
xt
=
b
1− aρ
xt ∀ t (3)
This reduced form expresses the endogenous variable yt as a linear function of the exoge-
nous variable xt. This solution shows that when the parameter ρ of the exogenous policy
3See section 3 for an illustration
5
rule changes, the reduced form parameter b/(1− aρ) will be evidently affected. The lack
of policy invariance of the reduced form parameter is a basic illustration of the Lucas
critique. Note also that the reverse representation of (3) also holds for each period:
xt =
1− aρ
b
yt ∀ t (4)
This latter equation that expresses the exogenous variable as a linear function of the
endogenous variable is on the basis of our demonstration of the perils of policy rule
regression that we will discuss further.
1.2 Policy Rule Regression and aggregate dynamics
We now present the principle of policy rule regression. The estimation method that we
use follows closely the usual practice of many empirical studies which aim to identify and
estimate policy rule parameters.
Suppose that an econometrician wishes to estimate a relationship between the forcing and
the endogenous variables. She assumes that the policy rule takes the form:
xt = ηEtyt+1 (5)
This type of policy rule, extensively used in applied monetary economics (see e.g. Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler (2000)), sets down that the policy variable xt reacts to expected changes
of the endogenous variable.4 Note that this equation can be expressed in terms of observed
variables:
xt = ηyt+1 + ε
y
t+1 (6)
where εyt+1 = η(Etyt+1 − yt+1), and Etε
y
t+1 = 0. An empirical issue concerns the econo-
metric method that the practitioner can use in order to identify and estimate the policy
parameter η. A full information estimation method requires to specify the complete
model, to find out its solution and compute its reduced form. The advantage of such
approach is that the policy equation is determined consistently as the parameters a, b
and η are estimated using the cross–equation restrictions created by the structural model.
Nevertheless, this approach faces some limits, as it implies to correctly specify the whole
model. The estimation of the parameters is, therefore, model dependant.5 To a certain
4We have also investigated the estimation of static and backward–looking policy rules. The results
about the estimated policy rule and the implied aggregate dynamics are rather similar. See the appendix
A–B for more details.
5Moreover, the feedback effect of the policy rule (5) implies that the dynamic properties of the equilib-
rium will depend on the (unknown to the econometrician) policy parameter η, given the values of a and
b in (1). Depending on the value of η, the equilibrium can be either determinate (|a + bη| < 1) or inde-
terminate (|a + bη| > 1), leaving a room for sunspot disturbances in this latter situation. The stochastic
dimension will thus differ: When the equilibrium is determinate, equations (1) and (5) will lead to a
regular solution, whereas when the equilibrium is indeterminate, the reduced form will be stochastically
driven by a sunspot shock.
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extent, this is why most of empirical studies prefer to use a limited information estima-
tion method. The main advantage of such method is that the econometrician does not
have to specify the complete Data Generating Process (DGP, hereafter). So, she does not
have to formulate arbitrary assumptions about functional forms, market arrangements,
constraints and the distribution of shocks, in order to infer something about the policy
parameters (see Hansen (2002) for a short discussion).
In order to estimate the policy function (5), the econometrician uses a set of instrumental
variables that are assumed to be sufficiently informative about the policy behavior. In
order to avoid the endogeneity problem, empirical studies use a set of predetermined –
or weekly exogenous – instrumental variables. We follow here exactly the same empirical
strategy. For simplicity and tractability, we assume that the econometrician uses a single
instrument. Since we are interested in the co–movements between xt and yt, the necessary
condition for identification of the parameter η is fulfilled. Let zt denote a single instrument
known in period t. This instrument verifies the following orthogonality condition
E
(
εyt+1zt
)
= 0
or equivalently
E ((xt − ηyt+1) zt) = 0 (7)
Equation (7) is the basis of the GMM estimation (or IV estimation in this simple case)
of the parameter η. As the number of orthogonality conditions is equal to the number
of parameter of interest, it follows that the GMM estimator is free from any weighting
matrix and can be obtained directly from (7). As previously mentioned, the instrument is
commonly a pre–determined variable, so let us assume that zt = yt−1. The orthogonality
condition (7) becomes :
E ((xt − ηyt+1) yt−1) = 0 (8)
From (8), the GMM estimator η̂ of η is given by :
η̂ =
Cov (xt, yt−1)
Cov (yt+1, yt−1)
In what follows, we will use this formula in order to compute the parameter estimate of
the policy function.6 Be aware on the fact that the econometrician observes data about
xt and yt that are generated by (2) and (3), i.e. a model with an exogenous policy
rule. Additionally, it is worth noting that the results are the same if we choose xt−1 as an
6Note that equation is obtained using covariances between x and y rather than expectations. The two
formulations are strictly equivalent as the model does not introduce constant terms both in (1) and (2).
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instrumental variable, since the reduced form (3) or (4) represents a one–to–one mapping.
Given the solution (3) and the exogenous process (2), the GMM estimator η̂ of the policy
function parameter η is given by:
η̂ =
Cov (xt, yt−1)
Cov (yt+1, yt−1)
=
(
b
1−aρ
)
ρV (xt)(
b2
(1−aρ)2
)
ρ2V (xt)
=
1− aρ
bρ
(9)
The estimated policy parameter η̂ depends on the deep parameters (a, b) and the pa-
rameter of the forcing variable ρ. As previously mentioned, the lack of policy invariance
of the estimated reduced form parameter provides an illustration of the Lucas critique.
The limited information estimation method ignores the true DGP and the cross-equation
restrictions created by the structural model. This estimated policy rule obviously does
not represent any endogenous policy behavior, but rather it describes (perhaps usefully)
an equilibrium relationship between the exogenous and the endogenous variables. This
result represents the first peril of policy rule regression.
Figure 1 illustrates the GMM estimate (9) of the policy parameter. For the ease of the
exposition, this figure shows the case of a bounded distribution of the innovation εt. The
solid line represents the expected linear function between the variables xt and yt+1 at the
equilibrium of the model economy, i.e. Etyt+1 =
b
1−aρ
ρxt, implied by (2) and (3), or
equivalently by (6) and (9). The shifts in the policy function are associated to the news
in expectations, i.e. to the unexpected changes of the exogenous variable given by
yt+1 =
b
1− aρ
(ρxt + εt+1)
Thus, in the equilibrium path, xt and yt+1 are related by the previous defined mapping,
disturbed by the realizations of εt+1. This is a graphic illustration of the first peril, where
an external observer could actually think that the policy variable xt reacts to changes of
Etyt+1, even though the true policy is exogenous.
For the second peril, we now explore the consequences of this misidentification of the policy
rule regression – when considered as a recommendation – on the dynamic properties of
the model economy. Given the estimated policy rule parameter (9) and the form of the
policy rule (5), the dynamic properties of the economy is obtained after substitution of
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Figure 1: Policy rule regression
the estimated policy rule in (1):
yt = aEtyt+1 +
1− aρ
ρ
Etyt+1
This equation rewrites,
ρyt = Etyt+1
Since |ρ| < 1, i.e. the exogenous variable follows a stationary process, the equilibrium
under the estimated (believed wrongly endogenous by the econometrician) policy rule is
indeterminate. A forward–looking policy rule under the model with exogenous policy
leads to indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. Note that this property of indeterminacy
holds even when a = 0, because the policy rule introduces an expectation about the
endogenous variable of the next period. This additional result represents the second peril
of the policy rule regression.
In order to better understand this finding, let us consider for simplicity the model economy
when a = 0 and b = 1. In this case, the solution is simply yt = xt and the estimated policy
rule parameter corresponds to the linear projection of xt on xt+1. Given the stationary
representation of the exogenous policy (2), the estimated policy rule parameter is 1/ρ. As
the reduced form is yt = xt, equation (1) rewrites yt = (1/ρ)Etyt+1. For any stationary
exogenous policy rule (2), the equilibrium is thus indeterminate.
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2 Extensions of the Original Model
Most of dynamic models with rational expectations involves so numerous restrictions that
it is costly to specify them correctly. Many researchers argue that such models are too
stylized to explain many features of the data. One approach to solve this limitation is to
augment the solution of the model with a serially error term. This error term accounts in
part for measurement errors, omitted variables or incorrect specifications of the structural
model. An alternative approach is to introduce additional structural disturbances in the
model. The aim of this section is to question the robustness of our previous results when
additional disturbances are considered.7 We first consider measurement errors and then
we present the multiple variables case.
2.1 Measurement Errors
The solution is now augmented with an error term:
yt = y
∗
t + ut (10)
where y∗t is given by (3) and the exogenous variable xt follows the same stationary stochas-
tic process (2). The error term ut is assumed to be a stationary and serially correlated
process:
ut = ρuut−1 + σuε
u
t with ε
u
t ∼ iid(0, 1) and |ρu| < 1 (11)
This approach is used by many studies that attempt to estimate dynamic stochastic
models (see Altug (1989), Mc Grattan (1994), Hall (1996), Mc Grattan, Rogerson and
Wright (1997), Ireland (2004)). Following Sargent (1989), some studies interpret the error
term as measurement errors, but it can be viewed as well as capturing the distance between
the solution found by the researcher and the rational expectations solution embodied by
the actual DGP.
Consider now the estimation of the policy function (5) when the data are generated
according to (2), (3), (10) and (11), and provided that εt and ε
u
t are not correlated for all
t. The GMM estimator η̂ of η is given by:
η̂ =
1− aρ
bρ
ν (12)
7We have also investigated the robustness of our results against other specifications of our simple
model. For example, when equation (1) is replaced by yt = aEtyt+1 + bEtxt+1 ≡ aEtyt+1 + bρxt,
the quantitative implications for policy rule regression and aggregate dynamics are exactly the same.
Moreover, if we consider yt = aEt−1yt+1 + bxt instead of (1), the results are left unaffected (see appendix
C for more details).
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with
ν =
(b2/(1− aρ)2)ρ2V (xt)
(b2/(1− aρ)2)ρ2V (xt) + ρ2uV (ut)
,
where V (xt) = σ
2/(1 − ρ2) and V (ut) = σ
2
u/(1 − ρ
2
u). It is worth noting that ν can be
expressed as well in terms of the conditional variance of yt on the exogenous variable
and the error term, since V (yt/xt) = (b
2/(1 − aρ)2)V (xt) and V (yt/ut) = V (ut). If the
contribution of xt to the variance of yt is large (e.g., the measurement errors are small,
or the model is roughly well specified), then we have ν ≃ 1 and the GMM estimator is
very close to the single exogenous variable case. Note that when the error term ut is iid
(ρu = 0) and/or the variance of this term is zero (σu = 0), we have ν = 1 and we retrieve
the GMM estimator of the single exogenous variable case. Conversely, if the measurement
errors explain a large part of the variance of yt, specifically, if ρ
2
u/ρ
2V (yt/ut) >> V (yt/xt),
we have ν ≃ 0 and thus η̂ ≃ 0.
This latter situation is illustrated by figure 2 where the shifts in the policy rule are the
result of two shocks, where those of the measurement errors are more important. The
large band represents the expected – conditional on ut – equilibrium relationship between
xt and yt+1 given by
Etyt+1 =
b
1− aρ
ρxt + ρuut
This band incorporates the fact that ut is a persistant (ρu 6= 0) stationary process. The
innovations of the policy function are bounded by the support of the shock term b
1−aρ
εt+1+
εut+1. Finally, the horizontal line is the policy rule regression with an estimated value η̂
of η close to zero. In this case, the econometrician could believe that the policy variable
x do not react on average to an expected change of the endogenous variable y. In fact,
even when there exist an equilibrium relation between these two variables, it is heavily
weakened by the importance of the measurement errors in the model.
We now study the implied dynamics of the model economy. After the substitution of (5)
and (12) into (1) and (10), the dynamics of the economy is given by:
yt = aEtyt+1 + ν
(
1− aρ
ρ
)
Etyt+1 + ut
The last term is unimportant for the dynamic properties as it involves an exogenous
stationary variable. It follows that if∣∣∣∣ ρaρ + (1− aρ)ν
∣∣∣∣ < 1
the equilibrium is indeterminate. When ν = 1, i.e. when the exogenous variable xt totally
accounts for the variance of the endogenous variable yt, we retrieve the previous result
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Figure 2: Policy rule regression with measurement errors
that policy rule regression implies indeterminacy. Conversely, when ν = 0 (or equivalently
η̂ = 0), i.e. when the variance of the endogenous variable yt is only explained by the error
term ut, indeterminacy occurs less likely as yt = aEtyt+1 + ut and |a| < 1.
2.2 Multiple exogenous variables
Most of macroeconomic models include several shocks – productivity, government spend-
ing, tastes, money supply – in order to improve the specification of the endogenous vari-
able.8 Moreover, a typical exercise in the business cycle literature is to identify the various
sources of aggregate fluctuations and thus to evaluate their relative contribution. We thus
extend the previous model to the case of multiple exogenous variables:
yt = aEtyt+1 +
m∑
j=1
bjxj,t (13)
where as before |a| < 1 and each exogenous variable xj,t follows an AR(1) process
xj,t = ρjxj,t−1 + σjεj,t with εj,t ∼ iid(0, 1) (14)
where |ρj| < 1 and σj > 0. We assume that the innovations verify
E(εj,tεj′,t) = 0 ∀j 6= j
′
8This section is very similar to the previous one, as the measurement error is replaced by additional
shocks with the same dynamic properties.
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So, the exogenous variables are uncorrelated. Note that the information set includes now
the present and the past values of all these sequences. From the independence of the
exogenous variables, if yjt for j = 1, ...,m is a stationary solution of
yjt = aE
(
yjt+1/x
j
t , x
j
t−1, ...
)
+ bjx
j
t
then yt =
∑m
j=1 y
j
t is a stationary solution of (13). Iterating (13) forward and using the
exogenous policy rules (14), the solution is given by
yt =
m∑
j=1
bj
1− aρj
xj,t (15)
Now, suppose that the econometrician does the same job as before. She estimates an
endogenous policy function for one variable among the m ones. Let x1,t be the selected
variable, so the policy function takes the form
x1,t = ηEtyt+1 (16)
The GMM estimator η̂ of η is, given that the instrumental variable is yt−1:
η̂ =
b1ρ1/(1− aρ1)V (x1,t)∑m
j=1 b
2
jρ
2/(1− aρj)2V (xj,t)
where V (xj,t) = σ
2
j/(1− ρ
2
j) for j = 1, ...,m. This estimator rewrites
η̂ =
1− aρ1
b1ρ1
ν (17)
where
ν =
V (yt/x1,t)
V (yt/x1,t) +
∑m
j=2(ρj/ρ1)
2V (yt/xj,t)
Since V (yt/xj,t) denotes the variance of yt conditional on xj,t, ν can be interpreted as the
weighted contribution of x1,t to the variance of yt. This is clear when all the weights are
the same, i.e. when ρ1 = . . . = ρm and ν simply reduces to
ν =
V (yt/x1,t)
V (yt)
If the contribution of x1,t to the variance of yt is large, we have ν ≃ 1 and the GMM
estimator is the same as the one obtained in the single exogenous variable case. Moreover,
when ρj = 0 or σj = 0 for j = 2, . . . ,m we have ν = 1 and we retrieve the GMM estimator
of the single exogenous variable case. Conversely, if the contribution of x1,t to the variance
of yt is very small, we have ν ≃ 0 and η̂ ≃ 0 (see figure 2 for an illustration).
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We now study the implied dynamics of the model economy. After the substitution of (16)
and (17) into (13), the dynamics of the economy is given by:
yt = aEtyt+1 +
1− aρ1
ρ1
νEtyt+1 +
m∑
j=2
bjxj,t
The last term is unimportant for the dynamic properties as it involves stationary exoge-
nous variables. It follows that if ∣∣∣∣ ρ1aρ1 + (1− aρ1)ν
∣∣∣∣ < 1
the equilibrium is indeterminate. The interpretation is the same as before. It is worth
noting that if V (yt/x1,t) → 0, indeterminacy occurs less often, since x1,t does not play an
important role in the determination of yt.
Another aspect of policy rule regression in the case of multiple exogenous variables con-
cerns the choice of the instrument. First, if the econometrician uses one of the other
exogenous variables xj,t for j = 2, ...,m as instrument, then the GMM estimator becomes
zero. This results from the independence of the exogenous variables. In such a case, the
lack of feedback effects leaves unaffected the dynamic properties of the original model.
Second, if she uses the exogenous variable x1,t itself as instrument, the IV estimator is the
same as in the model with a single exogenous variable. In this case, indeterminacy occurs
as |ρ1| < 1. It follows that the property of indeterminacy of the the estimated policy rule
is instrument dependant.
3 An Application: The Estimated Taylor Rule
Since Taylor (1993), abundant empirical evidence and some theoretical explorations have
defended the use of the so called interest rate policy rule, in order to control prices and
stabilize the economy. Further, it is implicitly assumed in applied monetary economics
that an active interest rate rule, i.e., a raise of the nominal interest rate by more than
a one–by–one basis to an increase of expected inflation, must rely naturally on an ac-
commodating money supply. This rule has been characterized as endogenous, where it
is thought that the central bank systematically fights excessive inflation by manipulating
its instruments. Therefore, an increasing literature, notably Taylor (1999) and Clarida,
Gal´ı and Gertler (2000), identifies these rules as good and stabilizing policies, or fine
examples of leaning against the wind by central banks.
However, some sceptics have argued that the estimation of such rules might not provide
sufficient information about the true behavior of policy–makers. Remarkably, Hetzel
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(2000) critics the Taylor principle in that the estimated rules describe rather the final
interest rate equilibrium relationship, and not the central bank’s performance. This is,
an inflation coefficient above one might not necessarily entails an aggressive policy nor
a good policy, but could also be the result of a pure reaction of the agents given their
expectations.
A minor interest has been left to discussion about the problems that may arise when there
is a misidentification of monetary policy given these interest rate rules. Our claim in this
section is to show how, within a simple framework, this misidentification can actually occur
when the Taylor regression is considered. We assume explicitly an exogenous monetary
policy rule and we let an econometrician to infer the true behavior of monetary authorities.
3.1 A Monetary Model
Consider an economy9 composed by a unit mass of infinite–lived expected utility max-
imizer agents, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. There is a competitive final–good sector, which is
labor intensive. For the ease of the analysis, let us assume that there is no capital accu-
mulation. Additionally, there exist a government who collects lump–sum taxes, consumes
the final good, and provides money, bonds and lump–sum transfers to the agents in the
economy.
Households
A representative household carries from period t− 1 the nominal balances Mt, and the
total revenues from bond holdings Rt−1Bt, where R is the gross nominal interest rate. In
period t, the household has a disposable nominal income Wtht − Tt per ht worked hours,
where Wt is the nominal wage and the Tt denotes lump–sump taxes. Additionally, the
household receives from the government the lump–sum transfer Nt. All the revenues are
used to buy the consumption good, Ct, money balances and bonds for the next period.
Consequently, its budget constraint is
Bt+1 + Mt+1 + PtCt + Tt 6 Wtht + Rt−1Bt + Mt + Nt (18)
The household holds cash in order to buy the consumption bundle and the bond holdings
in period t. Therefore, the CIA constraint has the form
PtCt + Tt + Bt+1 6 Mt + Rt−1Bt + Nt (19)
9We consider for simplicity of the exposition a flexible price model. We obtain the same quantitative
results with a sticky price model, i.e. when prices are set before the observation of the shocks of the
period. Appendix C simply illustrates this result where the conditional expectation operator Et in (1) is
replaced by Et−1.
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Let us assume that the instantaneous utility function of the household over consumption
and labor takes the form U(Ct, ht) = log(Ct)−ht. Therefore, the household maximization
problem is simply
max
Cτ ,hτ ,Mτ+1,Bτ+1
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t (log(Cτ )− hτ )
subject to (18) and (19). The subjective discount factor is β ∈ (0, 1), and Et denotes
the expectation operator conditional on the information set available at period t. The
optimal behavior in consumption, labor and bond holdings yields
1
Wt
=
1
β
Et
1
Pt+1Ct+1
and
Rt = Et
Wt
PtCt
Final-good sector
We consider a representative firm whose output, Yt, is produced by the technology
Yt = Atht
where At represent a technology shock. The real wage is thus given by Wt/Pt = At.
Government
The budget constraint of the government is given by
PtGt − Tt = Mt+1 −Mt −Nt + Bt+1 −Rt−1Bt
where Gt is the real government spending, and M0 and B0 are given. The money supply
is exogenously given and follows the simple money growth rule:
Mt+1 = γtMt
Shocks
We consider three exogenous disturbances: technology, money growth, and government
spending shocks. All of them are assumed to follow AR(1) processes, i.e.
log(At) = ρa log(At−1) + (1− ρa) log(A¯) + σε,aεa,t (20)
log(γt) = ργ log(γt−1) + (1− ργ) log(γ¯) + σε,γεγ,t (21)
log(Gt) = ρG log(Gt−1) + (1− ρG) log(G¯) + σε,GεG,t (22)
where εj,t ∼ iid(0, 1), with E(εj,tεj′,t) = 0 ∀ j 6= j
′. Further, σε,j > 0 and ρj ∈ (0, 1) for
all j ∈ {a, γ,G}.
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Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a set of prices {Pt,Wt, Rt} and an allocation {Ct, Yt, ht,Mt+1, Bt+1},
such that given prices, and all shocks, this allocation maximizes profits, households’ utility,
and clears all markets every period. A log–linear approximation around the deterministic
steady state characterizes the solution of the model in terms of the forcing variables
denoted by the vector θ = [ρa ργ ρG σε,a σε,γ σε,G]
′, and the private share, namely
ω = C¯/Y¯ , i.e. the ratio between consumption and output at the steady state. The
equilibrium of the economy is summarized by the following equations (hat letters are the
deviations from the steady state):
yˆt = ωcˆt + (1− ω)gˆt (23)
aˆt = Et [pˆit+1 + cˆt+1] (24)
Rˆt = aˆt − cˆt (25)
pˆit+1 = γˆt+1 − yˆt+1 + yˆt (26)
with (20), (21) and (22). Equations (23)–(26) collapse into the single expression
yˆt = aˆt − Et
[
1− ω
ω
(
yˆt+1 − gˆt+1
)
+ γˆt+1
]
(27)
If ω > 1
2
, the regular or determinate equilibrium gives the following solutions for output,
inflation, and the interest rate:10
yˆt = α0aˆt − α1γˆt + α2gˆt (28)
pˆit = γˆt + α1 (γˆt − γˆt−1)− α0 (aˆt − aˆt−1)− α2 (gˆt − gˆt−1) (29)
Rˆt = −β0aˆt + β1γˆt + β2gˆt (30)
where
α0 =
ω
ω(1− ρa) + ρa
α1 =
ωργ
ω(1− ργ) + ργ
α2 =
(1− ω)ρG
ω(1− ρG) + ρG
β0 =
α0 − ω
ω
β1 =
α1
ω
β2 =
(1− ω)− α2
ω
with αk, βk ∈ (0, 1) for k = 0, 1, 2, as long as ρj ∈ (0, 1) for all j ∈ {a, γ,G} and ω >
1
2
.
10This imposes that the share of public spending in output must be strictly less than 50%.
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3.2 The Taylor Regression
We use the model (28)–(30) with exogenous money growth rule, technology and govern-
ment shocks – (20)–(22) – as the true DGP. We are interested in the conditional moments
of the nominal interest rate and inflation, characterized by the equilibrium of the econ-
omy. Assume that an econometrician, in charge to evaluate the role of monetary policy,
and who observes only the realizations of the stochastic process generated by this DGP,
wants to estimate the following Taylor type rule
Rˆt = ηEtpˆit+1 (31)
We consider this rule, that relates the nominal interest rate only with inflation, as the
implied dynamic properties will depend on a single parameter. Moreover, previous em-
pirical results suggest that the estimates of η are unambiguously significant and positive
for the Volcker–Greenspan era (see Clarida et al. 2000). This rule can be expressed in
terms of observables as:
Rˆt = ηpˆit+1 + εt
with εt = η (Etpˆit+1 − pˆit+1). In the Taylor’s principle literature, the kind of rules as (31)
are usually estimated using GMM. Let zt denotes a single instrument known in period t,
that must verify the following orthogonality condition
E (εtzt) = 0
or equivalently
E
[(
Rˆt − ηpˆit+1
)
zt
]
= 0
The latter defines a simple IV estimator. As in previous empirical works, let us consider
the instrumental variable pˆit−1;
11. The GMM estimator is thus given by:
ηˆ =
Cov
(
Rˆt, pˆit−1
)
Cov
(
pˆit+1, pˆit−1
)
The estimator ηˆ depends on the parameters of the forcing variables θ and ω within the
monetary model.
Proposition 1 The GMM estimator ηˆ(θ, ω) of η is given by:
ηˆ(θ, ω) =
na(θ, ω) + nγ(θ, ω) + nG(θ, ω)
da(θ, ω) + dγ(θ, ω) + dG(θ, ω)
11Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (2000) include lagged inflation rates up to four lags. To keep tractable
results, we do not introduce over–identifying conditions.
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where
na(θ, ω) = β0α0(1− ρa)ρaσ
2
ε,a(1− ρ
2
G)(1− ρ
2
γ)
nγ(θ, ω) = β1(1 + α1(1− ργ))ργσ
2
ε,γ(1− ρ
2
G)(1− ρ
2
a)
nG(θ, ω) = −β2α2(1− ρG)ρGσ
2
ε,G(1− ρ
2
a)(1− ρ
2
γ)
da(θ, ω) = −α
2
0(1− ρa)
2ρaσ
2
ε,a(1− ρ
2
G)(1− ρ
2
γ)
dγ(θ, ω) =
{
ργ − α1(1− ργ)
2(1 + α1)
}
ργσ
2
ε,γ(1− ρ
2
G)(1− ρ
2
a)
dG(θ, ω) = −α
2
2(1− ρG)
2ρGσ
2
ε,G(1− ρ
2
a)(1− ρ
2
γ)
Proof: The moments are deduced from the solution equations (29) and (30). Since
all the exogenous shocks are independent from each other, E(xtx
′
t+s) = Cov(xtx
′
t+s) =
0 ∀ x 6= x′. Therefore, we have only to worry about the autocovariances of these
shocks. Some algebra let us express these moments as
Cov(Rˆt, pˆit−1) = β0α0(1− ρa)ρaV (aˆt) + β1 (1 + α1(1− ργ)) ργV (γˆt)
−β2α2(1− ρG)ρGV (gˆt)
and
Cov(pˆit+1, pˆit−1) = −α
2
0(1− ρa)
2ρaV (aˆt) + {ργ − α1(1− ργ)
2(1 + α1)}ργV (γˆt)
−α22(1− ρG)
2ρGV (gˆt)
where V (aˆt) = σ
2
ε,a/(1 − ρ
2
a), V (aˆt) = σ
2
ε,γ/(1 − ρ
2
γ) and V (aˆt) = σ
2
ε,G/(1 − ρ
2
G).
Further simplifications lead us to the estimator ηˆ(θ, ω) stated in Proposition 1.
2
Proposition 1 provides the GMM estimator of the Taylor type rule when the three shocks
are considered. In such a case, the expression of ηˆ(θ, ω) does not deliver a simple in-
terpretation of the estimated parameter of the policy function. Nevertheless, there exist
simplifications with clearer interpretations.
Corollary 1 In the absence of technological and government shocks, and with a zero
long–run value on government spending, i.e. when θ ≡ θ′ = [0 ργ 0 0 σε,γ 0]
′ and
ω = 1, the GMM estimator η̂ of η rewrites
ηˆ(θ′, 1) =
1
ργ
In this single shock case, the coefficient of the expected inflation will be greater then one as
long as the growth rate of money be a stationary stochastic process. Since only the terms
related to V (γˆt) do not vanish, an equivalent interpretation is that the weight of this term
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placed on the denominator is smaller. Thus, we should expect that if the weights of V (aˆt)
and V (gˆt) are particularly small on Cov(Rˆt, pˆit−1) and Cov(pˆit+1, pˆit−1), then ηˆ(θ, ω) could
be still greater than one.
Corollary 1 provides a clear illustration of the first peril in the policy rule regression
principle, i.e. an econometrician could interpret ηˆ > 1 as an aggressive interest rate rule
(with an accommodating growth rate of money), when in fact it is an exogenous money
growth rule that prevails. Therefore, we conclude that the single–equation analysis is not
robust to avoid policy misidentifications. This will be shown clearly in section 3.3. For
the moment, let us illustrate the consequences of the second peril, i.e. when the policy
regression estimation is taken seriously and becomes a policy recommendation.
Indeterminacy
Assume now that, convinced that an aggressive interest rate rule is good for the stabi-
lization of the economy, the central bank decides to abandon the constant–mean growth
rate of money and instead introduces an accommodating rate, namely γ˜t. The money
growth process is now endogenous, and is intended to sustain the forward–looking policy
rule (31).
The new system that determines the rational expectations equilibrium, incorporates this
information and replaces the AR(1) process of money growth by the interest rate rule
(31). Once again, the equilibrium conditions collapse into a single equation:
yˆt = ηEtyˆt+1 + ω(1− η)aˆt + (1− ω)(1− ηρG)gˆt (32)
Following previous studies, notably Calrstrom and Fuerst (2000), equation (32) shows
that an aggressive forward–looking interest rate rule, i.e. with some |η| > 1, generates
real indeterminacy or an irregular equilibrium.12
3.3 A Calibration Exercise
The aim of this section is to show that the simple monetary model described in section
3.1 can actually match the empirical moments of the estimated Taylor rule for the U.S.
economy. Table 1 presents the parametrization that we consider in this quantitative exer-
cise. These are values that could be believed as standard in the business cycle literature
(see the note below table 1 for a discussion).
Table 2 presents the calibrated value η̂ and the estimation of Clarida et al. (2000) as
the benchmark for the empirical estimate of η. This tables also considers three calibrated
12see also Benhabib, Schmitt–Grohe and Uribe (2001a)
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Table 1: Parameters Values for calibration
Parameters Values Source
(ρa, σε,a) (0.98, 0.0072) King and Rebelo (1999)
(ργ, σε,γ) (0.49, 0.0089) Cooley and Hansen (1995)
(ρG, σε,G) (0.96, 0.0210) Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)
ω 0.823⋆ ibid.
Note : The technology coefficients are the standard ones used in the RBC literature for the U.S., here
updated by King and Rebelo (1999) over the sample period 1947:1–1996:4, quarterly observations.
Cooley and Hansen (1995) reports the parameters of an AR(1) process for the M1 growth over the
period 1954:1–1991:2. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) measures the government spending as real
government purchases of goods and services minus real investment; its estimation period covers 1955:3–
1983:4.
⋆In Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) the average ratio between government spending and output
equals 0.177, therefore we set the private share on 0.823. Nevertheless, our main results hold if we take
instead the average ratio between private consumption and output, which equals 0.56.
values ηˆ that depend on three different specifications about the origin of the shocks. First,
we assume that the three shocks are present, and the private share is fixed according to
Table 1. Second, we remove the government disturbance and we set ω = 1. With this, we
intend to give a first look at the effect of the government spending shock on the calibrated
parameter. Finally, we assume that the unique source of disturbance is the money growth
process, and we set again ω = 1. At the bottom of Table 2 is the baseline estimation of
expected inflation of Clarida et al. (2000) for the Volscker–Greenspan era.
The similarity between the calibrated and the estimated parameter is evident. Thus, the
risk of possible policy misidentification is sustained. At this point, a word of caution
is necessary. Table 2 does not tell us that the actual DGP of the U.S. economy is in
fact the simple flexible–price monetary model presented above, but that even this kind of
model can match the empirical ηˆ of the policy rule estimation for the U.S. Moreover, it
is possible that other types of monetary models, with more realistic assumptions in their
fundamentals, could match as well this parameter estimate. It must be clear by now that
the single–equation analysis tell us very little about the true policy behavior of the central
bank, and that the limited information estimation method by itself is unable to screen
the actual monetary rules of the authorities.
A second question that we have to answer is: Why the calibrated value ηˆ did not change
significatively when the technological and government spending shocks were included?
According to section 2.2, this is precisely what we should expect if the contributions of
the technological and government shocks explain just a small part of the total variance
of inflation and the nominal interest rate. Table 3 presents the variance decomposition
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Table 2: The calibrated and estimated ηˆ
Shocks
Governement, technological and money shocks 2.14⋆
No government, only technological and money shocks 2.04
No government, only money shocks 2.11
Baseline estimate of Clarida et al. (2000) 2.15
Note: The estimation of Clarida et al. (2000) corresponds to the tenures of Paul Volcker and Alan Greenspan
over the sample period 1979:3–1996:4.
⋆If we consider the alternative measure of the private share mentioned in the note of table (1), equal to 0.56,
the calibrated coefficient changes to 2.3541.
Table 3: Variance decomposition (in %)
Inflation Nominal interest rate
Horizon Technology Money Government Technology Money Government
1 16.6 77.4 6.0 0.0 99.9 0.1
2 16.2 77.9 5.9 0.0 99.8 0.2
3 16.1 78.1 5.9 0.0 99.8 0.2
4 16.0 78.1 5.9 0.0 99.7 0.3
5 16.0 78.1 5.9 0.0 99.7 0.3
...
100 16.1 78.0 5.9 0.0 99.0 1.0
of these variables accounting for the contributions of the three shocks. In both cases, the
money growth process largely explains the forecast error variances of these variables (in
the short and in the long run). After 100 periods, the money shock justifies 78 and 99
per cent of the variance of inflation and the interest rate, respectively.
Finally, let us explore the aggregate dynamic properties when the estimated Taylor type
rule is placed in the original model. From equation (32) and Table 2, we see immediately
that the estimated value η̂ of η leads to real indeterminacy as η̂ ≃ 2(> 1). This illustrates
again the second peril of policy rule regression.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper provides a general overview of the policy rule regression program. Our main
finding is that, within the framework of a rational expectations model, policy rule re-
gression that uses a limited information estimation method tells us very little about the
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actual structural behavior of policy–making. In fact, the parameter estimates of such
program account only for the description of an equilibrium relationship between the en-
dogenous and exogenous variables, and cannot be associated with a unique kind of policy
rules. In order to fully identify the effects of economic policy, a complete exercise within
a structural model is required.
We identified two perils in the implementation of actual policy regression. The first one
is policy misidentification. Although this threat is not too important when it is limited
to a pure description of the policy behavior, its consequences become serious when it
is transformed in a policy advice. This is the second peril, and deals with spurious
recommendations potentially able to create real indeterminacy and sunspot equilibria. In
fact, in the monetary model considered, an estimated aggressive forward–looking interest
rate rule will always lead to real indeterminacy when placed in the original model.
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Appendix
A Static Policy Rule
Consider the following static policy rule
xt = ηsyt
We apply the same empirical methodology dsicribed in section 1.2. Notably, we use yt−1
as the instrumental variable. The GMM estimator η̂s of ηs is given by:
η̂s =
Cov(xt, yt−1)
Cov(yt, yt−1)
=
1− aρ
b
After replacement into (1), one gets:
yt = aEtyt+1 + (1− aρ)yt
or equivalently if a 6= 0
ρyt = Etyt+1
As |ρ| < 1, the equilibrium under the estimated policy rule is indeterminate.
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B Backward Policy Rule
Consider now a backward policy rule
xt = ηbyt−1
yt−1 is again the instrumental variable as in sections 1.2 and A. The GMM estimator η̂s
of ηs is given by:
η̂b =
Cov(xt, yt−1)
V (yt−1)
= ρ
(
1− aρ
b
)
After replacement into (1), one obtains:
yt = aEtyt+1 + ρ(1− aρ)yt−1
The dynamic properties of the economy is characterized by a second order linear differ-
ence equation. The equilibrium is indeterminate if the two roots of the characteristic
polynomial lie inside the unit circle. The two (real) roots of the characteristic polynomial
are:
λ1 = ρ and λ2 =
1− aρ
a
It follows that indeterminacy occurs when |λ2| < 1, i.e. when |a| > 1/(1 + ρ). Note
that when indeterminacy occurs, the stable root λ2 is positive and the model displays
persistence, provided ρ ∈ (0, 1).
C Another specification of equation (1)
Consider now that the economy takes the form:
yt = aEt−1yt+1 + bxt (33)
where b 6= 0 and |a| < 1. The policy rule is always given by (2). The stationary solution
is
yt =
bρ
1− aρ
xt−1 + bεt
or equivalently
yt =
b
1− aρ
xt −
abρ
1− aρ
εt
The GMM estimator η̂ of the forward policy function parameter η (see equation (5)) is
given by:
η̂ =
Cov (xt, yt−1)
Cov (yt+1, yt−1)
=
(
bρ
1−aρ
)
V (xt) (1− aρ(1− ρ
2))(
b2ρ2
(1−aρ)2
)
V (xt) (1− aρ(1− ρ2))
=
1− aρ
bρ
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The dynamic properties of the economy is obtained after substitution of the estimated
policy rule in (33):
yt = aEt−1yt+1 +
1− aρ
ρ
Etyt+1
Taking the expectation operator Et−1, this equation rewrites,
ρEt−1yt = Et−1yt+1
Since |ρ| < 1, i.e. the exogenous variable follows a stationary process, the equilibrium
under the estimated policy rule is indeterminate.
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